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Trade ministers from around the world gathered in Seattle
November 30 through December 4 to launch a new round of
global trade negotiations.  Their objective was to set an agen-
da for broadening world trade, creating new opportunities for
producers, and cutting costs for consumers.  Trade in many
industries was on the table, with agriculture a key focal point.
While agreement on launching the new trade round
proved elusive in Seattle, the world community is still rethink-
ing how to improve world trade.  U.S. agriculture has much at
stake in these deliberations.  Much of the industry’s bounty is
shipped abroad, though the industry’s foreign sales have a
boom and bust history.  A new global trade agreement may
not end the ebb and flow of U.S. farm exports, but it can
broaden access to world markets and build a healthier global
economy, which underpins the industry’s foreign sales.
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Unfettered trade in a healthy global
economy remains vitally important to
U.S. agriculture.  Each year nearly a
fourth of the industry’s production—
including roughly a third of the nation’s
crop production and a tenth of its live-
stock production—is destined for foreign
markets.  Farm exports rose steadily in
the first half of the decade to a crest of
$60 billion in fiscal 1996.  But then the
industry’s foreign sales tumbled to $49
billion in 1999 in the wake of the finan-
cial problems in Asia and other important
markets.  The farm export slump drove
down farm commodity prices, again
underscoring the industry’s reliance on
foreign markets.
Looking ahead, demand for agricul-
tural exports should strengthen as popu-
lations grow and incomes rise, especially
in developing countries.
Current projections show
that by 2010 more than 80
percent of the world’s peo-
ple will live in Asia, Africa,
and Latin America.  And
rising incomes in these
parts of the world should
enable more people to
spend more money on food
than ever before.  During
most of the 1990s, growth
in developing economies
was more than double the
pace in the richer developed
nations.  Although many
developing economies have
stumbled in recent years,
most indicators suggest
these countries are bouncing back.  
This combination of rapid growth in
populations and incomes is a potent
recipe for boosting world food demand.
By tearing down the roadblocks that still
impede the flow of food around the globe
and sustaining income gains in the devel-
oping world, a global trade agreement




The Seattle meeting brought together
the 135 members of the World Trade
Organization (WTO), which governs
international trade rules and provides a
mechanism for settling trade disputes. Its
member-nations account for 90 percent
of world trade and the bulk of the world’s
population.  On the table was trade in
sectors ranging from services to telecom-
munications and electronic commerce.
But existing trade policies in many of these
countries continue to make agriculture
one of the most highly protected indus-
tries in the world.  As a result, agricultur-
al trade was a key focal point in Seattle
and will probably remain at the top of
the agenda when trade talks resume.
In eight previous rounds of interna-
tional trade negotiations dating back to
World War II, talks centered mainly on
manufactured goods.  Tariffs on these
internationally traded goods were
trimmed to an average of just 4 percent.
Only the most recent trade talks—name-
ly the Uruguay Round—targeted trade
policies in agriculture, where tariffs still
average about 40 percent.  Four key
issues remain in agricultural trade:  mar-
ket access, farm support policies, export
subsidies, and product regulations.
Tariffs and quotas
hinder market access
Two trade barriers, tariffs and quotas,
significantly hinder global sales of farm
products.  A tariff is a tax on imports,
while a quota limits the quantity of agri-
cultural products flowing into a country.
Both tariffs and quotas protect the
importing country’s producers from for-
eign competition while raising prices for
its consumers.  
The Uruguay Round attempted to
improve market access by eliminating quo-
tas and converting to tariffs all other trade
barriers that limit imports.  Recognizing
that imports could be restricted by high
tariffs and that some countries rely on a
small number of agricultural products, the
Uruguay Round created tariff-rate quotas.
A tariff-rate quota is a combination of a
quota and a tariff that sets relatively low
tariffs on imports up to a
certain level, but raises the
tariff rates for additional
imports above that level.
Such a policy, it was hoped,
would maintain historical
trade levels and open all
markets to some competi-
tion from abroad. 
Success of the
Uruguay Round was limit-
ed, though, as some coun-
tries set very high tariffs or
found other artful ways of
circumventing the
Uruguay Round commit-
ments.  Many countries
imposed low tariffs on
imported products not also
produced domestically, while setting high
tariffs on imports that competed directly
with domestically produced goods.
Other countries discriminated against
individual countries when allocating quo-
tas under tariff-rate quotas.  The chal-
lenge ahead is to build on the limited
success of the Uruguay Round, by further
reducing tariffs and lifting quotas and by
tightening the rules on market access
commitments.
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Billion dollarsFarm support programs
encourage excess production
Another key challenge is to reduce
farm support programs.  Support pro-
grams subsidize domestic production in
many countries, causing surpluses that
push down world market prices.  And
where world prices are down, govern-
ments are encouraged to further subsidize
their producers in an expensive cycle.  On
the agenda for reform are farm support
programs in three areas previously identi-
fied in the Uruguay Round: amber box,
blue box, and green box policies.
Amber-box policies significantly dis-
tort global production and trade, and so
the Uruguay Round restricted their use.
Amber-box policies boost farm incomes
by subsidizing the prices paid or received
by farmers, encouraging excess production
that is often shoved onto the world mar-
ket at discount prices.  Examples of
amber-box policies in the U.S. and EU
include dairy, sugar, and beef price sup-
port programs, subsidized insurance pre-
miums, commodity loan interest subsi-
dies, and storage payments.
The impact of amber-box policies can
be gauged by a numerical index called the
aggregate measure of support (AMS),
which enables the WTO to compare these
policies with an eye toward winding them
down.  Nearly 90 percent of the world’s
AMS in 1995 was concentrated in the
European Union, U.S., and Japan. 
Blue-box policies are less harmful to
world trade than amber-box policies.  Like
amber-box policies, blue-box policies sub-
sidize farm incomes, which can encourage
price-depressing surpluses in future years.
But blue-box policies reduce the potential
for building up excess supplies by also
requiring farmers to limit production.
For example, deficiency payments in the
U.S. and compensatory payments in the
EU both make payments to producers
based on fixed or historical production
and then limit production countrywide
with acreage reduction programs.
Prior to 1996, U.S. farmers could
receive a deficiency payment that made up
the difference between
the market price for
some crops and a higher
target price.  This price
subsidy, however, was
combined with limits




price subsidy might oth-
erwise encourage.  A





that are fixed in amount
and not affected by the
level of production.  These new payments
are included in the green box.
Green-box policies have the least effect
on production and trade and thus have
been permitted by the WTO.  Green-box
policies include programs such as domes-
tic food aid, research, inspection, natural
disaster relief, crop insurance, environ-
mental programs, rural assistance, and
farm income support payments (like the
U.S. market transition payments) that are
“decoupled” or not tied to the level of
production.  As long as policies do not
distort production decisions and thus
world trade, they are likely to be included
in the green box and allowed by trade
negotiators.
The U.S. objective stated at the
Seattle meeting was to further establish a
fair and market-based trade system by
winding down trade distorting farm sup-
port policies.  Useful approaches include
improving the calculation of AMS indices
and trimming amber-box policies, elimi-
nating blue-box policies or requiring them
to be transformed into less harmful green-
box policies, and tightening the definition
of green-box policies.
Export subsidies dump supplies
on world markets 
A third important farm-trade challenge
is the elimination of export subsidies.
Many countries aim to boost incomes for
domestic producers by paying them a sub-
sidy as their products leave the country.
Like domestic support programs, export
subsidies encourage excess production and
push down world prices.  As a result,
incomes for domestic producers rise and
incomes for foreign producers fall.
Currently, the use of export subsidies
is concentrated in just a few countries, but
their impact on world markets is still a
problem.  In 1996, the European Union
was the largest user of export subsidies,
accounting for 84 percent of the world’s
total (Chart 2).  The United States was
fourth, due mainly to the dairy support
program.  Many countries, including the
United States, have already proposed to
eliminate export subsidies.
Product regulations can conceal
trade barriers
The final farm-trade challenge is per-
haps the most difficult one.  In recent
years, many countries have limited or
banned imports of various goods, citing
concerns over food safety or plant and
animal health standards.  Food safety and
health standards are legitimate concerns
that can be addressed by various regula-
tions, including product standards and
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testing, labeling requirements, or bans on
unacceptable imports.  When product
regulations are applied arbitrarily or with-
out a sound scientific base, however, they
become thinly disguised trade barriers. 
To address such unfair product regu-
lations, the Uruguay Round created
agreements on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (SPS) and Technical Barriers to
Trade (TBT).  SPS measures allow coun-
tries to set their own standards regarding
plant, animal, and human health.  These
standards must be based on science and
cannot discriminate against individual
countries.  Similarly, the TBT agreement
ensures that regulations, standards, test-
ing, and labeling requirements do not
create artificial barriers to trade.
Perhaps the most notable case where
product regulations were used to discrim-
inate against imports was the EU’s ban
on U.S. beef produced using growth hor-
mones.  The EU cited a potential health
risk for European consumers.  The
United States objected and asked the
WTO to settle the dispute.  Last summer
the WTO ruled the EU ban was based on
unscientific regulations, and the U.S. was
allowed to impose trade sanctions on the
EU to recoup an estimated loss of $117
million in beef exports.
Although U.S. agriculture won a
major victory in the EU beef case, regula-
tions on genetically modified organisms
(GMOs) still present significant stum-
bling blocks to trade in several foreign
markets.  The European Union, Japan,
and others have enacted policies that
either ban genetically modified crops or
require products made from them to be
labeled in certain ways.  Such policies
have a huge effect on U.S. producers,
since about 44 percent of U.S. soybeans
and 36 percent of U.S. corn are grown
with genetically modified seeds.
The global leadership of U.S. compa-
nies in developing GMO products and
their growing use by U.S. farmers makes
stricter guidelines for product regulations
a critical negotiating point in trade talks.
Unless future trade agreements can
strengthen the scientific basis required for
such regulations, exports from the United
States and other countries could be hurt,
producer costs could rise, and consumers
around the world could be denied access
to valuable new products.
Conclusions
The Seattle meeting of the WTO
placed agriculture at the top of its agen-
da, promising to address fundamental
flaws that continue to hamper the flow of
farm products around the globe.  While
the Seattle meeting failed in its ambitious
agenda to launch a new round of global
trade talks, agricultural trade will remain
a key focal point of future trade negotia-
tions.
U.S. agriculture has much at stake in
the future course of world trade. With
nearly a fourth of its output shipped
abroad each year, the industry is heavily
reliant on the world’s trading system. A
recent slump in farm exports triggered a
downturn in the U.S. farm economy and
reminded the industry of the up and
down nature of its foreign sales.  But
export prospects are beginning to
improve again, as economic recovery
takes root in Asia and other important
markets. 
Unfettered trade promises a further
expansion in the global economy, as pro-
ducers from the United States and other
countries gain freer access to world mar-
kets and consumers gain access to prod-
ucts from other lands. As global incomes
rise, food demand grows—especially in
the developing countries that are U.S.
agriculture’s most promising customers.
While the ebb and flow of U.S. farm
exports is likely to continue in the years
ahead, further trade reform is the indus-
try’s best bet to strengthen the foundation
underpinning its foreign sales.
The Center for the Study of
Rural America will track the shifting
currents in the rural economy each
month in The Main Street Economist.
In-depth studies of major rural eco-
nomic and policy issues will appear in
the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas
City's Economic Review and other
publications.  Next spring, we will
launch a new national conference on
rural issues.  
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